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quent acts in reliance, may necessitate modification of the remedy granted. 7 Since
knowledge of rights is an essential element of laches, 5 the delay alleged to be laches
will be measured only from the time when the stockholder became or could reasonably
have become aware of the true state of affairs.29
Apart from other factors the court may employ the statute of limitations to defeat
the claims of a stockholder, although usually in a case such as the principal one 3* a claim
so barred would also be barred by laches, which is independent of the statute. 3' The
statute of limitations is often applied in equity by statutory enactment or by analogy. 3 2 Where it is not applied, courts often use the statute to determine what constitutes a reasonable time with respect to application of the laches doctrine, 3 but if a
strict view is maintained, it would seem that this analogy is not well taken, for the only
consideration of importance in deciding whether the defense of laches is to prevail is
the damage caused to the defendant or third parties by the plaintiff's delay.

Injunctions-Restitution and Damages as Remedies for Wrongful Issuance of
Injunction-[Federal].-After final dismissal' of a suit maintained by a power company to enjoin the making of a PWA loan to a county for the purpose of building a competing power plant, the county brought suit against the power company for restitution of the profits gained by the company at the expense of the county by reason of the
delay in putting the proposed plant into operation.2 On appeal from the decree of the
district court dismissing the suit, held, the relief could not be granted as damages aris27Int'l & G.N.R. Co. v. Bremond, 53 Tex. 96 (i88o) (plaintiff permitted personal recovery,
although right to enjoin corporate action was lost by laches).

28Kessler & Co. v. Ensley Co., 129 Fed. 397, 418 (C.C. Ala. 19o4); Briggs v. Buzzell, 164
Minn. x16, 204 N.W. 548 (1925); Wright v. Simpson, 200 Ill. 56, 65 N.E. 628 (1902). X3
Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 5876 (perm. ed., 1932).
29Wills v. Nehalem Coal Co., 52 Ore. 70, 96 Pac. 528 (igo8); Kessler & Co. v. Ensley &
Co., 129 Fed. 397 (C.C. Ala. 19o4); Taylor v. S. N. Alabama R. Co., 13 Fed. 152 (C.C. Ala.
1882). 13 Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. § 5876 (perm. ed. 1932). Cases other than those concerned with
lack of knowledge concerning corporate transactions which state the same rule are Waters v.
Waters, 155 Md. 146, r42 AUt. 297 (1928); Briggs v. Buzzell, 164 Minn. 16, 204 N.W. 548
(1925).

30Frank v. Wilson & Co., 9 A. (2d) 82 (Del. Ch. z939).
3' Smalley v. Queen City Bank, 94 S.W. (2d) 954 (Mo. App. 1936); see Peabody v. Carr,
313 Pa. 325, 169 At. 126 (1933).
3' 1 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 24, at § 419.

33Gillons v. Shell Co. of California, 86 F. (2d) 6oo (C.C.A. 9th 1936); White v. Harby,
176 S.C. 36, 179 S.E. 671 (1935).

I For an account of the litigation in this suit, see Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co.,
107 F. (2d) 484 (C.C.A. 4 th 1939).
2 After the first decree had been vacated in accordance with the mandate of the Supreme

Court in 299 U.S. 259 (1936), the power company obtained a preliminary injunction upon posting of the bond required for preliminary injunction under the statute, 38 Stat. 738 (1914),
28 U.S.C.A. § 382 (1928). The county also sought damages on this bond in the instant case,
but was refused on the ground that the court has discretion as to the prosecution of the bond,
Russell v. Farley, io5 U.S. 433 (i88i); cf. Houghton v. Meyer, 2o8 U.S. 149 (1907). At the
date of the decision in Russell v. Farley there was no federal bond statute; and it may well be
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ing from an erroneously issued injunction, and the facts did not present a proper case
for restitution. Judgment affirmed. Greenwood County v.Duke Power Co.3
Recovery for harm suffered by the defendant under an erroneously issued injunction is often dependent upon whether the recovery must be described as restitutionor as
danmages. Where the benefit received by the plaintiff in the injunction suit through its
issuance bears a close relation in kind and amount to the harm suffered by the defendant, the defendant may recover under the rules as to restitution;4 on the other
hand, where the benefit received by such plaintiff bears no relation, either in kind or
amount, to the harm suffered by the defendant, the defendant must recover, if at all,
under the rules as to recovery of damages under an erroneously issued injunction.s
Recovery of damages incurred under an erroneously issued injunction may be had
only in those cases in which the injunction plaintiff either has acted with so little cause
as to give rise to a suit for abuse of process, 6 or has given a bond for the payment of
damages.7 In all other cases in which the recovery must be described as damages, the
defendant must himself bear the loss. 8 It has been said that "Public policy was
thought to demand that the free pursuit of remedies in the courts should not be obargued that an object of Congress in enacting the statute was to abolish the judge's discretion
as to prosecution of the bond. The argument is fortified by the fact that one of the grounds for
the decision in Russell v. Farley was that there was no controlling statute.
3 107 F. (2d) 484 (C.C.A. 4 th r939).
4 A common situation is that in which a public utility has secured an injunction against the
enforcement of a lower rate order; the utility receives the difference between the higher and
the lower rate, which amount is exactly equal to that lost by the public by reason of the injunction, Arkadelphia Co. v. St. Louis & S.W.R. Co., 249 U.S. 134 (1918); notes x4-18 infra.
s A common example is that in which the price of securities falls while the injunction against
their sale pending determination of a dispute as to ownership is in force. Clay Center v.
Williamson, 79 Kan. 485, ioo Pac. 59 (igog); Osage Oil & Refining Co. v. Chandler, 287 Fed.
848 (C.C.A. 2d 1923).
6 It is usually said that the fact that a permanent injunction is granted is conclusive as to
the plaintiff's having had sufficient cause, in a subsequent suit for abuse of process. Crescent
City Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union Slaughter-House Co., 120 U.S. 141, iSo (1887).

Furthermore, in the instant case the petitioner did not allege that the suit was instituted
without probable cause. Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 107 F. (2d) 484,487 (C.C.A.
4 th 1939).
7The requirement of bond as a prerequisite to issuance of an interlocutory injunction
has long been a part of equitable procedure. See Yonkers v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., 221
N.Y. 206, zi6 N.E. 998 (1917); Russell v. Farley, 1o5 U.S. 433, 438 (i88i); Smith v. Day,
21 Ch. Div. 421 (1879). The bond is now required by statute in many states. The statutes,
however, are applicable only to interlocutory injunctions, and do not apply to permanent injunctions. The Recovery of Damages on Injunction Bonds, 32 Col. L. Rev. 869, 870 (1932);
School Board v. Edwards, 184 Okla. 384, 87 P. (2d) 962 (1939); Wilburn v. North Jellico Coal
Co., 272 Ky. 749, 115 S.W. (2d) 288 (x938); Felton v. Wedthoff, 185 Mich. 72, I51 N.W. 727
(1915); Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Cluggish, r43 Ind. 347,42 N.E. 743 (1896); Commonwealth
v. Franklin Canal Co., 21 Pa. 117 (1853). In the principal case, there was no interlocutory

injunction until after the remand by the Supreme Court, and, for reasons stated in note 2
supra, no damages were allowed on that bond.
8 Meyers v. Block, 120 U.S. 206, 211 (z887); Russell v. Farley, io5 U.S. 433, 437 (i8i);
Palmer v. Foley, 71 N.Y. 1o6 (1877). Contra: Davis v. Poitevant & Favre Lumber Co., 15
La. App. 657, 132 So. 790 (i93i).
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structed by the menace of liability for innocent mistakd."9 Furthermore, even though
the plaintiff has initiated the suit, the effective action is that of the judge, ° and it is
from the judge's action alone that the damage arisesy
The reasons given for the refusal to allow recovery of damages do not apply with
the same force, however, when the injunction defendant seeks restitution. To say that
public policy requires that the injunction plaintiff be not penalized is not to imply that
he must be allowed actually to profit by reason of the innocent error. And although a
judge may be reluctant to require a plaintiff to pay for the judge's error when the
plaintiff has received nothing tangible, such a reluctance need not be felt in requiring
the plaintiff to pay back what was actually gained by reason of the error. Moreover,
to allow a plaintiff to retain benefits received offers an actual premium for the instigating of an injunction suit, for whatever the result in the suit itself the plaintiff has
gained the profits accruing during its pendency.
Consequently, restitution of benefits received under an erroneous court order is
given in a variety of situations. The right to restitution of money paid under a judgment later reversed has long been recognized,- and jurisdiction will be taken to enforce
the right even though the court was without jurisdiction to render the first order.3
Restitution of crops grown while in possession under an injunction has been ordered
upon dissolution of the injunction, despite the rule that the tenant in adverse possession gets the crops.' 4 The remedy is available to a public officer against one who has by
9 Cardozo, J., in Yonkers v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., 221 N.Y. 2o6, i6 N.E. 998
(1917); St. Louis v. St. Louis Gaslight Co., 82 Mo. 349, 355 (i884).

10 United Motors Service v. Tropic-Aire, 57 F. (2d) 479, 483 (C.C.A. 8th

1932);

Russell v.

Farley, 1O5 U.S. 433, 438 (i88i): ...... for the damage arising from the act of the court

itself is damnum absque injuria, for which there is no redress except a decree for the costs of
the suit, or, in a proper case, an action for malicious prosecution."
"That such is the case appears clearly from the distinction taken between interlocutory and permanent injunctions, as to the giving of a bond. The interlocutory injunction is the action of the judge, but he may make it the plaintiff's by requiring a
bond; but the permanent injunction is granted after full hearing, and is the action of the judge
alone. Consequently even if a bond has been required under the interlocutory injunction, no
damages may be recovered on it for harm arising under the permanent injunction. The Recovery of Damages on Injunction Bonds, 32 Col. L. Rev. 869, 871 (1932). Contra: Corpus
Christi Gas Co. v. Corpus Christi, 46 F. (2d) 962 (C.C.A. 5th 1931), cert. den. 284 U.S. 636
(i93i); cf. Mica Insulator Co. v. Commercial Mica Co., I57 Fed. 92 (C.C. Ill. x907); North
Carolina Gold Amalgamating Co. v. North Carolina Ore Dressing Co., 79 N.C. 49 (1878).
12 See

Haebler v. Myers,
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N.Y. 363, 3o N.E. 963 (i892); Rest., Restitution § 74 (I936).

The principle is applied to a number of situations, such as the recovery of a criminal fine.
See 26 A.L.R. 1523 (1923). In re Wiltse, 5 Misc. xo, 25 N.Y. Supp. 733 (1893) (allowing
recovery of funds paid creditors by assignee in bankruptcy, where some creditors had not been
notified); In re Lilyknit Silk Underwear Co., 73 F. (2d) 52 (C.C.A. 2d 1934) (allowing recovery
of composition dividends by objecting creditors where decision sustaining composition later
reversed).
X3Northwestern

Fuel Co. v. Brock, 139 U.S. 216 (i8oi).
Plaza Farmers Union Warehouse &Elevator Co. v. Tomlinson, 176 Wash. 178, 28 P. (2d)
299 (1934) (perhaps based on statute, Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 807). That
the recovery is restitution rather than damages appears from Rabb v. Patterson, 42 S.C. 528,
'4

20

S.E. 540, 541 (1894): "We think ....

he could only be required to account for the rents
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an erroneous court order obtained the salary and fees of an office to which the plaintiff
is entitled,"s and has often been ordered in public utility litigation after dissolution of
an injunction obtained by the utility against the enforcement of an order of a regulatory commission.16 In the utility cases, restitution has been granted even in favor of a
party who was not a party to the record, and the claim has been considered so substantial as to be accorded a preference over the claims of all secured creditors upon the
bankruptcy of the utility. s
In the principal case, restitution would appear to be a proper remedy, in that the
plaintiff has done business which would otherwise have been done by the defendant:
the plaintiff has by reason of the injunction made a gain which bears a close relation in
kind and amount to the loss suffered by the defendant. There are nonetheless several
explanations for the cases 9 denying recovery.
Some weight must be given to the fact that the injunction suit brought about the
determination of an unsettled question of law; and while the same might be said of any
lawsuit, the principal one differs in that the power company was in effect acting in the
interest of a large group who were anxious to have the matter determined. Although
this consideration should not have any effect on the right to restitution, in that restitution does not penalize a party for bringing a lawsuit, it must be admitted that its
presence does go far to prevent an extension of the doctrine of restitution in the instant

case .

20

In the second place, despite the clear analytical distinction between damages and
restitution, some courts tend to deal with all harm arising under an injunction as
damages, and the mere fact that there is an injunction seems to foreclose the possibility of restitution. 2 r This tendency is particularly noticeable in cases where a bond
and profits actually received by him, and not for the 'rental value' of the premises"; cf.
Hoppas v. Bremer, rig Kan. 411, 239 Pac. 96i, 962 (1925) (suit for specific performance of land
contract brought by party out of possession; lower court decision in favor of party in possesson
reversed): ".... . the plaintiff upon its reversal could recover by way of restitution, not necessarily all that he lost through the error of the court .... but all the defendant had wrongfully
474, 478 (1863): "The
gained from him by virtue of it." But see Edwards v. Edwards, 31 Ill.
question is not, what the land was worth to the complainant in the injunction suit, but what
was the damage to the defendant for being left out of possession during the period."
Is United States for the use of Crawford v. Addison, 6 Wall. (U.S.) 291 (1867); Kreitz
Adm'x v. Behrensmeyer, 149 Ill. 496, 36 N.E. 983 (z894); Rest., Restitution § 137 (1936).
'6Arkadelphia Co. v. St. Louis & S.W.R. Co., 249 U.S. 134 (i918); Baltimore & O.R. Co.
v. United States, 279 U.S. 781 (1929); Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153 (1939)
and 307 U.S. !91 (1939).
X7Arkadelphia Co. v. St. Louis & S.W.R. Co., 249 U.S. 134 (i918) (commission having

made order for benefit of public, shippers could sue for restitution in their own names).
18Love v. North American Co., 229 Fed. 1o3 (C.C.A. 8th z9z5). But cf. Berthold-Jennings
Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co., 8o F. (2d) 32 (C.C.A. 8th 1935), cert. den. 297 U.S.
715 (1936).
'9
20

Notes 21-3 infra.
Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 107 F. (2d) 484, 488-9 (C.C.A. 4 th 1939).

2" United Motors Service v. Tropic-Aire, 57 F. (2d) 479 (C.C.A. 8th 1932) (patentee enjoined manufacture and sale of patented article; patent later held void for lack of invention,
but claim for restitution denied). In St. Louis v. St. Louis Gaslight Co., 82 Mo. 349 (1884), the
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has been given, and there is a doubt as to the extent of liability under the terms of the
bond. Thus, where the plaintiff had obtained an interlocutory injunction under bond
against the postmaster's charging a higher rate, and later obtained a permanent injunction, the postmaster was unable, after dissolution of the injunction, to collect the
difference in rates accruing during the time the permanent injunction was in force, the
bond being held to impose liability only for damages under the interlocutory injunction.22 No contention for restitution appears even to have been made; the postmaster
seems to have made his claim on the damages theory alone. Again, where the injunction plaintiff, who had been supplying natural gas to the defendant, obtained an erroneous injunction against the defendant's installing its own pipe line, the defendant
was unable to get "damages" in excess of the penalty of the bond.23 The failure to
make a closer analysis of the type of harm suffered may perhaps be explained by pointing out that even in the relatively few injunction cases where a claim for restitution
might be made, the harm suffered is often such that only part of it could be recovered
as restitution, and the remainder, if recovered at all could only be recovered as damages. The presence of both types of harm in the same case undoubtedly confuses the
issues, with the result that since most injunctions give rise to damages rather than to
claims for restitution, the courts tend to apply damages theory to the entire claim.24
city obtained an injunction against the company's pursuing its business, and an order for the
appointment of a receiver. Upon reversal of these orders, the company was unable to recover
the profits lost by the receiver's sale of gas at a lower rate. The court treated the whole claim as
one for "damages"; and, indeed, the company appears also to have treated its claim solely as
one for "damages."
The Supreme Court, however, usually makes a clear distinction between damages and
restitution. Lawrence v. St. Louis-S.F.R. Co., 278 U.S. 228, 233 (1929); Ex parte Lincoln
Gas & Electric Light Co., 257 U.S. 6, io (.192); Arkadelphia Co. v. St. Louis & S.W.R. Co.,
249 U.S. 134, 145 (i918).
22 Houghton v. Meyer, 2o8 U.S. 149 (1907). In an analogous case, Minneapolis, St. P. &
S.S.M.R. Co. v. Washburn Lignite Coal Co., 254 U.S. 370 (1920), where a carrier which had
been erroneously required to charge a lower rate was suing the shippers for restitution, the
claim was denied on the ground that the shippers had not had notice that they might be required to pay more. Such an equitable ground for denying restitution would hardly be applicable in the Houghton case (even if a claim for "restitution" had been made) in view of the fact
that the particular shipper against whom the suit was brought had himself instigated the
previous injunction suit, and therefore had ample notice that he might not be paying all that
was required. See Golde Clothes Shop v. Loew's Buffalo Theatres, 236 N.Y. 465, 141 N.E.

917 (1923).
23Citizens' Pipe Line Co. v. Twin City Pipe Line Co., 183 Ark. ioo6, 39 S.W. (2d) E017
(i931); see St. Louis v. St. Louis Gaslight Co., 82 Mo. 349 (x884); Keber v. Mercantile Bank,
4 Mo. App. i95 (1877). But see Ex parte Lincoln Gas & Electric Light Co., 257 U.S. 6 (1921),
where the mere fact that there was a suit on a bond did not prevent a claim for restitution.
'4 Occasionally, however, what amounts to restitution is given under the name of damages,
by either straining or disregarding the rules as to recovery of damages. Thus, in a suit on a
bond given in i8go, an injunction defendant was awarded rent on the lands since i888, Rabb v.
Patterson, 42 S.C. 528, 20 S.E. 541 (1894); and a lessee who had been erroneously restrained
from cutting timber was given possession for a "reasonable time" in addition to the length of
his lease, besides his damages under the bond, Bevil v. Kirby Lumber Co., 58 S.W. (2d) 843

(Tex. Civ. App. 1933). See Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery,

102

F. (2d) 58 (C.C.A. 7 th 1939),

where, although the injunction bond was $6,ooo,ooo, recovery of almost three times that
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A third consideration in the instant case, which not only explains, but also may
justify the decision, is that the amount of profits to be recovered is uncertain. Even if
the theory were damages instead of restitution, the uncertainty might prove a bar to
recovery; for although there are cases where expected profits from an enterprise not
yet established are allowed as damages, recovery is apparently given only on the
ground that there is some other standard than previous profits by which to measure
the lost profits,"s while in the principal case it may be argued that there is no other
adequate standard.26 Furthermore, where the claim is on restitution theory, the rule
as to certainty is even more strictly applied than in damages cases. In practically all
the situations in which restitution has been given after reversal of a court order, the
amount was either certain or easily ascertainable,7 and restitution has in at least one
instance been denied on the express ground that the amount was uncertain.21 Several
notions as to restitution appear to lead the courts to apply the rule as to certainty
much more strictly in restitution cases than in damages cases. That restitution is repayment in kind 29 carries with it an implication that the amount must be certain; that
amount was allowed. It may be, however, that recovery of "damages" in excess of the penalty
of the bond is the usual practice in Illinois, Kohisaat v. Crate, 144 Ill. 14, 32 N.E. 481 (1892).
2'julian Petroleum Co. v. Courtney Petroleum Co., 22 F. (2d) 36o (C.C.A. 9th x927);
Whitelaw v. United States, 9 F. (2d) io3 (D.C. Cal. 1925).
26 The suggestion that the county had made contracts for the sale of power might be taken
to furnish some criterion for ascertaining the amounts of profits lost, but since the county was
apparently unwilling to limit recovery to an amount represented by the contracts, the standard
so presented is of only limited value.
The attempt of the county to make use of the power company's testimony in the injunction
suit itself, to the effect that the power company would lose $25o,ooo per year if the injunction
was not granted, is open to two objections. In the first place, the figure was stated merely as
an estimate, and is open to the same objection of uncertainty as is any attempt to establish the
amount of profits lost by the county. In the second place, the mere fact that the power company may have gained $25oooo a year by reason of the injunction does not mean that the
county lost a similar amount; to allow recovery based solely on profits gained by the injunction
plaintiff might be to allow something more than "profits gained at the expense of the defendant," for the defendant may not have been in a position to make the same profits. The only
precedents wherein it is held that the amount of restitution can be measured solely by the
amount gained are waiver of tort cases, wherein the fact that the defendant had acted tortiously may in some measure account for the decisions, Federal Sugar Refining Co. v. United States
Sugar Equalization Board, 268 Fed. 575 (D.C. N.Y. 1920); Caskie v. Philadelphia Rapid
Transit Co.,

321

Pa. 157, 184 Atl. 17 (1936); Rest., Restitution, c. 7, Introductory note and

§ i(e) (1936). Where a party has acted tortiously, he may well be required to give up all he
has gained, but where he has innocently invaded another's right, there may be some reason for
allowing him to retain whatever he makes in excess of the amount the other party could have
made by exercising the right. However, since the plaintiffs in the cases cited had "waived"
the tort, it would seem that the tortious element in the defendants' conduct should not, strictly
speaking, affect the measure of recovery.
'7 Cases cited in notes 12-I8 supra. For a different view see Castleman v. Williams, 263
S.W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
29 Note 29 supra.
'9 Tenth Ward Road Dist. v. Texas & P.R. Co., 12 F. (2d) 245 (C.C.A.
United Motors Service v. Tropic-Aire, 57 F. (2d) 479 (C.C.A. 8th 1932).

5 th

1926); cf.
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the plaintiff must pay because he holds in trust 3o for the defendant means that the
funds must be traceable and therefore certain; and the notion that the plaintiff is
required to pay upon an implied promise3 because "in equity and good conscience
he ought to have promised," can be much more easily applied where the amount is
certain, since the imposition of an implied promise to pay an uncertain amount seems
more arbitrary than the imposition of an implied promise to pay a sum certain.
It may be urged, however, that a court of equity should find some difficulty with
the proposition thus established: the power company ought to pay something, but
because the amount it should pay is uncertain, it will not be required to pay anything
at all. While it is true that the amount cannot be ascertained with the same degree of
certainty that has usually characterized restitution cases, still it cannot be said that
there is no precedent for allowing recovery. Thus, where a commissioner's court created a second office of justice of the peace to serve in the same territory with the first
justice of the peace, and the first obtained an erroneous injunction against the second's
taking office, the second recovered a jury's estimate of the amount of profits lost, although there appears to have been no standard of measurement.32 Furthermore, the
county in the instant case was able to present at least some criterion of measurement.
The county alleged that it had made a number of contracts with prospective customers
who would take an estimated half of the total production; and there is also a statement
made by a witness for the power company in the injunction suit, to the effect that the
power company would lose $250,000 per year if the injunction was not granted. It is
submitted that the objections to the use of these standards of measurement 3 are not
so grave as to prevent an extension of the doctrine of restitution so as to allow recovery
in the instant case; that any injustice inherent in the possibility that the power company might be required to pay more than it took from the county is far outweighed by
the manifest injustice of a complete denial of recovery.

Labor Law-Effect of Anti-injunction Acts on Municipal Ordinances, CommonLaw Actions, and Sherman Act-[Washington].-The defendant was prosecuted for
violating an anti-picketing ordinance of the city of Yakima which declared it illegal to
"walk back and forth, loiter or remain upon the streets" in front of any business house
for the purpose of dissuading anyone from entering such place of business, The
30 Love v. North American Co., 229 Fed. io3 (C.C.A. 8th 1g1s); Berthold-Jennings Lumber
Co. v. St. Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co., 8o F. (2d) 32 (C.C.A. 8th I935), cert. den. 297 U.S. 715

(1936).

N.Y. 363, 30 N.E. 963, 964 (1892).
S.W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). The recovery is really
restitution, but in view of the facts that it is called "damages" (recoverable on injunction
bond) and that, as already pointed out, where damage theory is applied the measure may be
less certain than in restitution cases, the question may be raised whether recovery would have
been allowed if it had been necessary to call it "restitution."
33 Note 24 supra.
I In addition, the ordinance provided: pickets must be citizens of the United States, must
never have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, must walk on the outer margin of the sidewalk, and only two may picket at any one place. The maximum penalty for
violation of the ordinance was $ioo fine and ninety days imprisonment. Yakima Ord. No.
31 Haebler v. Myers,
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32 Castleman v. Williams, 263

B-,3Oi (1939).

